Job polarization, structural transformation and biased technological change by Barany, Zsofia L. & Siegel, Christian
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Barany, Zsofia L. and Siegel, Christian  (2019) Job polarization, structural transformation and
biased technological change.   Travail et Emploi .       (In press)
DOI





Job polarization, structural transformation and 
biased technological change * 
Zsófia L. Bárány   Christian Siegel 
October 2018 
Abstract 
 By reviewing our work in Bárány and Siegel (2018a,  
2018b), this article emphasizes the link between job polarization 
and structural change. We summarize evidence that job 
polarization in the United States has started as early as the 
1950s in the US: middle-wage workers have been losing both in 
terms of employment and average wage growth compared to 
low- and high-wage workers. Furthermore, at least since the 
1960s the same patterns for both employment and wages are 
discernible in terms of three broad sectors: low-skilled services, 
manufacturing and high-skilled services, and these two 
phenomena are closely linked. Finally, we propose a model 
where technology evolves at the sector-occupation cell level 
that can capture the employment reallocation across sectors, 
occupations, and within sectors. We show that this framework 
can be used to assess what type of biased technological change 
is the driver of the observed reallocations. The data suggests 
that technological change has been biased not only across 
occupations or sectors, but also across sector-occupation cells. 
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1  Introduction 
Over the last several decades the labor markets in most developed countries have 
experienced substantial changes. Since the middle of the twentieth century there has 
been structural change, the movement of labor out of manufacturing and into the 
service sectors. One of the key explanations for structural transformation is 
differential productivity growth – or biased technological progress – across sectors, 
combined with complementarity between the goods and services produced by 
different sectors (Ngai and Pissarides (2007)).1 At the level of occupations several 
papers documented the polarization of labor markets in the United States and in 
several European countries since the 1980s: employment shifted out of 
middle-earning routine jobs to low-earning manual and high-earning abstract jobs. 
The main explanation for this phenomenon is the routinization hypothesis, which 
assumes that information and computer technologies (ICT) substitute for 
middle-skill, routine occupations, while they complement high-skill, abstract 
occupations; in other words technological progress that is biased across occupations 
(Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Autor and 
Dorn (2013), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014)). Both literatures study the 
impact of differential productivity growth. One focuses on the productivity across 
sectors and its interaction with the demand for goods and services, while the other 
focuses on the productivity of tasks or occupations, and its impact on the relative 
demand for these occupations. In this paper we review our previous work which 
suggests that these two phenomena are connected and should not be studied in 
isolation, especially in order to understand the driving forces behind the reallocation 
of labor across sectors and occupations.  
In Bárány and Siegel (2018a) we show that polarization started much earlier than 
previously thought, and that it is closely linked to the structural transformation of the 
economy. This on its own suggests that there might be a common driving force 
behind structural transformation and polarization. In Bárány and Siegel (2018b) we 
go further; we demonstrate that there is an even tighter connection between the 
sectoral and occupational reallocation of employment, and we explicitly study the 
technological changes underlying both.  
In Bárány and Siegel (2018a) we document first that in the US occupational 
polarization both in terms of wages and employment has started in the 1950s, much 
earlier than suggested by previous literature. Second, we show that a similar 
polarization pattern is present for broadly defined sectors of the economy, low-skilled 
services, manufacturing, and high-skilled services. Moreover, we show that a 
significant part of the occupational employment share changes is driven by shifts of 
employment across sectors, and that sectoral effects also explain a large part of 
occupational wage changes. These findings suggest that the decline in routine 
employment is strongly connected to the decline in manufacturing employment. We 
propose a model to show that differences in productivity growth across sectors lead 
                                                 
1
 Some papers emphasize changes in the supply of an input which is used at different intensity across 
sectors (Caselli and Coleman (2001), Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)). Other papers study the role of 
non-homothetic preferences, where changes in aggregate income induce a reallocation of employment 
across sectors (Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Boppart (2014)). 
3 
to the polarization of wages and employment at the sectoral level, which in turn 
imply polarization in occupational outcomes. 
In Bárány and Siegel (2018b) we look at the data from a different perspective: we 
study employment patterns across sector-occupation cells in the economy. We 
document some trends in occupation and sector employment that have not received 
much attention in the literature. First, the manufacturing sector has the highest share 
of routine workers; by far most of the decline in routine employment occurred in 
manufacturing, and conversely almost all of the contraction in manufacturing 
employment occurred through a reduction in routine employment. Second, the 
high-skilled service sector has the highest share of abstract workers; most of the 
expansion in abstract employment happened in the high-skilled service sector, and 
most of the increase in high-skilled service employment was due to an expansion in 
abstract employment. These patterns reveal that the sectoral and the occupational 
reallocation of employment are closely linked. Furthermore, the overlap of 
occupations and sectors implies that it is hard to identify the technological changes 
which underlie the observed labor market patterns. To overcome this issue, we 
specify a flexible model of the production side of the economy in which 
technological change can be biased towards workers in specific sector-occupation 
cells. We use key equations of this model together with data from the US Census and 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to draw conclusions about the bias in 
productivity changes across sector-occupation cells.  
This approach departs from the recent literature connecting the phenomena of 
structural change and polarization across occupations in that we do not a priori 
restrict the nature of technological change. Goos et al. (2014) suggest that differential 
occupation intensity across sectors and differential occupational productivity growth 
can lead to employment reallocation across sectors. Duernecker and Herrendorf 
(2016) show in a two-sector two-occupation model that unbalanced occupational 
productivity growth by itself provides dynamics consistent with structural change and 
with the trends in occupational employment, both overall and within sectors. Lee and 
Shin (2017) allow for occupation-specific productivity growth and find that their 
calibrated model can quantitatively account for polarization as well as for structural 
change, and in an extension find a limited role for sector-specific technological 
change. Aum, Lee, and Shin (2018) analyze the role of routinization (differential 
productivity growth of occupations) and computerization across industries as well as 
industry-specific TFP differences in the recent productivity slowdown, and find in 
their model with homogeneous labor that sectoral TFP differences have a rather small 
effect.  
The close link in the data between the sectoral and occupational reallocation of 
labor explains why models which allow for productivity growth differences only at 
the sectoral or only at the occupational level can go a long way in accounting for the 
reallocations across both dimensions. However, such restricted models load all 
differences in technological change on one type of factor, therefore not allowing to 
identify whether these differences arise indeed at the level of sectors or of 
occupations. We view our framework as an important and useful first step in 
identifying the true bias in technological change. In this article we explain how 
certain aspects of the data can be used to draw qualitative conclusions, whereas in 
Bárány and Siegel (2018b) we use a richer methodology to quantify the bias in 
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technology across sector-occupation cells and to decompose it further into common 
components. To summarize our results, we find that technological change has been 
biased in more nuanced ways, not just across occupations or sectors, but across 
sector-occupation cells. 
2  A historical perspective on polarization 
In Bárány and Siegel (2018a) we use data from the US Census between 1950 and 
2000 and the 2007 ACS to study the patterns of employment and wages both across 
occupations and across sectors. In the following three subsections we summarize the 
main empirical results we established there. Our main findings are the following: (1) 
occupational polarization both in terms of wages and employment started as early as 
1950 in the US, (2) wage and employment polarization is also visible in terms of 
broadly defined industries, (3) a large part of polarization in terms of occupations is 
driven by changes at the level of industries. In subsection 2.4 we go further and 
document the changes in employment at the sector-occupation cell level where we 
see a strong overlap between the evolution of occupational and sectoral employment 
trends.  
2.1  Occupational polarization 
Figure 1 plots the smoothed changes in log real wages and employment shares for 
occupational percentiles, with occupations ranked according to their 1980 mean 
hourly wage, following the methodology used in Autor et al. (2006), Acemoglu and 
Autor (2011), and Autor and Dorn (2013). Departing from the literature, we do not 
restrict attention to recent years but show the changes starting from 1950 for different 
30-year periods. The left panel shows that there has been (real) wage polarization 
throughout, as occupations towards the middle of the wage distribution gained less 
than occupations at both extremes. The right panel shows that also in terms of their 
shares in hours worked, middle earning occupations have been tending to do worse 
than both low- and high-earning occupations. Though the pattern is less striking than 
for wages, polarization of employment has occurred since the 1950s.  
To get a sense of which occupations are driving these changes and whether there 
are any significant differences across decades, in Figure 2 we show for 10 coarser 
occupational categories the decade-by-decade change in total hours worked and mean 
log wages. The categories we use follow Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and are ranked 
according to the occupations’ mean wages, from lowest earners on the left to highest 
earners on the right. Between 1950 and 1960 a clear pattern cannot be discerned, 
whereas from 1960 onwards, it is clear that both total hours worked and mean log 
wages grew faster at both extremes than for occupations in the middle.  
Finally, following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we classify occupations into 
manual, routine and abstract categories.2 Figure 3 plots their paths of relative wages 
and of employment shares. The left panel shows the path of occupational premia. 
These premia are the exponents of the coefficients on occupation dummies, obtained 
from a regression of log wages controlling for gender, race, a polynomial in potential 
experience, as well as occupation dummies. Obtaining the occupation premia from 
                                                 
2
 See box in section 2.3 for details of which 1-digit occupational codes are in each. 
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these regressions allows us to disregard changes in wage differences across 
occupations which are potentially caused by age, gender, or racial composition 
differences. It is worth to note that, as expected, the manual premium is less than the 
routine, while the abstract premium is the largest. However, over time, the advantage 
of routine jobs over manual jobs has been falling, and the advantage of abstract jobs 
over routine jobs has been rising. The right panel shows that the employment share of 
routine occupations has been falling, of abstract occupations has been increasing 
since the 1950s, while of manual occupations, following a slight compression until 
1960, has been steadily increasing. Thus, the middle earning group, the routine 
workers, lost both in terms of relative average wages and in terms of the employment 
share to the benefit of manual and abstract workers. 
All these figures constitute evidence that at the occupational level there has been 
employment and wage polarization in the US since at least the 1960s.  
2.2  Sectoral polarization 
Similar patterns can be discerned when considering the economy in terms of three 
broad sectors, low-skilled services, manufacturing, and high-skilled services. As 
common in the structural change literature our manufacturing category includes 
mining and construction (e.g. as in Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013)), 
and we split services in two (e.g. as in Buera and Kaboski (2012), Duarte and 
Restuccia (2017), Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2017)). Classification of 
economic activities into broad sectors for the purpose of a model should be such that 
industries within sectors are very good substitutes, while they are complements 
across sectors. Since the service sector as a whole includes very different types of 
services, by splitting it in two, we improve with regards to this criterion.3 
Figure 4 plots for these three sectors how wage premia and shares of hours 
worked evolved over time. Similarly to the occupational premia, these sector premia 
are calculated from a Mincerian log wage regression as the exponents of the 
coefficients on sector dummies, where we also control for gender, race, and a 
polynomial in potential experience. By construction, these sector premia do not 
contain changes in wage differences across sectors which are potentially caused by 
age, gender, or racial composition differences. As the left panel of the figure shows 
workers in low-skilled services typically earn less and workers in high-skilled 
services more per hour than those in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, it reveals 
that there has been a pattern of wage polarization in terms of sectors, as the wage 
premia in low- and in high-skilled services have been increasing since the 1960s 
relative to manufacturing. The right panel of the figure shows the evolution of 
employment shares across sectors. Manufacturing employment has been falling since 
the 1960s, while employment in both low- and high-skilled services has been 
increasing. Putting it differently, there has been employment polarization at the 
sectoral level as the employment share of the middle-earning sector has declined 
relative to both the low- and high-end sectors. 
                                                 
3
 See boc in section 2.3 for details of which industries are in each sector. 
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2.3  Quantifying the impact of sectoral changes on 
occupations 
A standard shift-share decomposition can be used to quantify the contribution of 
sectoral employment share changes to each occupation’s employment share changes. 
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 is the employment share of industry i in the 
economy at time t, we denote the change between period 0 and t with Δ, and with the 
variables without a time subscript we denote the average of the variable between 
period 0 and period t. The first term captures the between-industry changes, this is 
the change in the employment share of occupation o due to changes in the industrial 
composition, while the changes due to within-sector reallocations are represented by 
the second term. 
Table 1 shows the results from this decomposition for the three broad 
occupational categories. We conduct this decomposition for either our 3 broad 
occupations and 3 broad sectors, or for 10 broad occupations and 11 broad sectors.4 
No matter the time frame or the number of industrial/occupational categories we 
consider, we find that a significant part of each occupation’s employment share 
change is driven by between-industry forces. Between 1960 and 2007 around a half 
of the change in the manual employment share, about a third of routine, and around a 
quarter of abstract employment share change is driven by changes in the industrial 
composition of the economy.  
In a similar fashion we decompose relative occupational wage changes into a 
component that is due to industry effects and one that is due to occupation effects. 
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 denotes the wage 
premium of occupation o in industry i in period t. We implement the three-way 
decomposition as follows. The occupation effect is the change in the occupational 
                                                 
4
 These 11 categories are: 1 personal services; entertainment and low-skilled business and service 
repairs, 2 low-skilled transport, 3 retail trade, 4 wholesale trade, 5 extractive industries, 6 
construction, 7 manufacturing, 8 professional and related services and high-skilled business 
services, 9 finance, insurance, and real estate, 10 high-skilled transport and public utilities (incl. 
communications), 11 public administration. 
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). Table 2 shows the 
results of this decomposition. It is apparent in this table that both manual and abstract 
occupations have been gaining in terms of wages relative to routine workers. 
Furthermore this table shows that more than half of occupational wage changes can 
be due to industry effects: due to either the reallocation of manual or abstract workers 
to industries with higher wages, or by faster wage growth in those industries where 
manual or abstract workers are employed more intensively. 
2.4  Overlap between occupational and sectoral 
employment 
While the shift between sectors per se has implications for occupational outcomes, it 
is informative to consider the evolution of employment at the level of 
sector-occupation cells since there are several distinct patterns. For the three broad 
sectors and the three occupational categories defined above, Figure 5 plots the 
evolution of sector-occupation employment shares in the U.S. between 1960–2007. 
The black lines show the employment share of each sector (manufacturing, low- and 
high-skilled services), which is then broken down into manual, routine, and abstract 
occupations. The economy’s structural transformation is apparent in the pronounced 
decline in the manufacturing sector’s employment and the rise in (particularly 
high-skilled) service sector employment. Occupational employment polarization is 
manifested in the fall of the share of routine occupations.  
However, looking at occupations and sectors more carefully, two additional facts 
are apparent. First, the manufacturing sector has the highest share of routine labor. 
Second, by far most of the decline in routine employment occurred in manufacturing, 
whereas in the two service sectors it declined only slightly. Similarly, almost all of 
the increase in the employment share of abstract occupations took place in the 
high-skilled service sector, and most of the increase in manual employment up to 
2000 was in low-skilled services. It is these patterns that imply that different 
economic models can explain both the sectoral and the occupational reallocations to a 
large degree through either sector- or occupation-specific technological change alone. 
However, as many models tend to a priori restrict attention to one form of 
technological bias, for instance only across sectors (as in Bárány and Siegel (2018a)) 
or only across occupations (e.g. as in Goos et al. (2014) or Duernecker and 
Herrendorf (2016)), they remain silent about the nature of the bias in technological 
change, despite replicating many aspects of the data. 
In Bárány and Siegel (2018b) we take a different approach and propose a flexible 
setup that allows for productivity changes that are neutral (economy-wide), specific 
to firms in particular industries (producing particular products), specific to workers in 
certain occupations (linked to their task content), or specific to occupation-sector 
cells. In the next section we outline key features of this model and explain how 
certain aspects of the data inform us about how productivity changed differentially 
across sectors and occupations. One important aspect is that we focus on employment 
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reallocations not only between sectors and occupations, but also between occupations 
within sectors. Inspecting Figure 5 closely reveals for instance that routine 
employment declined not only overall, but also as a share within each sector. In the 
next section we show that observing the changes in occupational wages, 
within-sector shares of employment and of income, and sectoral prices, allows us to 
infer what type of biased technological change has been occurring. 
3  Technological biases 
To understand what type of technological change might be driving these phenomena, 
we formulate a model of the production side of the economy. There are two key 
assumptions in our framework. The first is that we explicitly assume that workers of 
different occupations are not perfect substitutes, and thus the factors of production 
are the labor supplied in various occupations. This formulation is based on the 
observation that there are significant differences in wages across occupations, and 
that different occupations perform different tasks. Second, we allow for different 
sectors to value these types of workers differently in production. In the following we 
outline the key features of the model and draw some conclusions about the likely 
biases in technological change based on the data we summarized in the previous 
section. In Bárány and Siegel (2018b) we go much further by providing a framework 
that can be used to quantify factor-augmenting technological change from objects in 
the data and by decomposing these further into neutral, sector, occupation, and 
idiosyncratic components.  
3.1  Assumptions: The production side of the economy 
The three sectors in the economy respectively produce in perfect competition 
low-skilled services (L), manufacturing (M), and high-skilled services (H). Labor is 
the only input in production, but differentiated in terms of occupations. Each sector J ∈ {L, M, H} employs all three types of occupations (manual, routine and abstract), 






















  (1) 
where η ∈ [0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the different types of labor, 
l
oJ is occupation o labor used in sector J, and a oJ > 0 is an sector-occupation 




 in the initial year reflects the initial productivity as well as the 
intensity at which sector J uses occupation o, whereas any subsequent change over 
time reflects sector-occupation specific technological change. The assumption that 
the productivity depends on both the sector and the occupation of the worker renders 
this production function very flexible, as it does not impose any restrictions on the 
nature of technological change. In particular, it does not require taking a stance on 
whether technological change is specific to sectors or occupations.  
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Firms in all sectors take prices and wages as given and maximize profits by 
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Combining these first order conditions for different occupations, optimal relative 





































These expressions demonstrate how optimal relative labor demand depends on the 
relative wages and on the relative productivity of different occupations. Ceteris 
paribus, all sectors optimally use more manual labor relative to routine labor if the 









)h - 1 is larger then it is optimal to use relatively more manual labor in that 
sector. It is important to note that an improvement in the relative productivity of for 





, would lead to a 
different impact on the optimal relative labor use depending on whether η is larger or 
smaller than 1. If η > 1, then the different occupations are good substitutes, so the 
improvement in the relative productivity of manual workers would lead to an 
increased relative demand for manual workers. If, on the other hand η < 1 and the 
different workers are complements, then an improvement in relative technology 
would lead to a reduction in relative demand. So for example routinization in sector 
J, i.e. the replacement of routine workers by certain technologies, would be captured 








)h - 1.  
Using optimal manual and abstract labor as a function of routine labor from (3) 



























3.2  Inferring technological biases 
The assumptions we made about the economy’s production side constitute a 
framework which, given η, the elasticity of substitution between the different types 
of occupational labor within sectors, can be used to draw conclusions from the data 
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about the sector-occupation specific labor augmenting technologies, the αs. While 
there is no consensus on the exact value of η, the literature agrees that occupations 
tend to be complements, and therefore this elasticity of substitution has to be less 
than 1. Goos et al. (2014) estimate, Duernecker and Herrendorf (2016), Lee and Shin 
(2017) and Aum et al. (2018) calibrate the elasticity of substitution to be between 0.5 
and 0.9. For this reason in what follows we assume that η < 1, that is that the 
different occupational labor inputs are complements in production. 

























































)  denotes the share of income in sector J going to 
occupation o workers. Note that we assume that there is perfect competition, the 
production function is constant returns to scale, and that the only factors of 





= 1. From these equations we can see that given data on relative 
occupational wages and on occupational income shares within sectors we can infer 
the evolution of relative occupational productivities within a sector. 
We are primarily interested in the change in relative sector-occupation 
productivities within sectors over time. For this reason, in Figure 6 we plot the 
evolution of relative wages of different occupations relative to their 1960 values. 
Wages in both abstract and manual occupations increased relative to routine 
occupations. Overall the gain in relative wages was around 25 percent in abstract 
occupations and around 38 percent in manual occupations. In Figure 7 we show the 
evolution of relative occupational income shares in all three sectors between 1960 
and 2007, relative to their 1960 values. The income share of both abstract and manual 
workers increased relative to routine in all three sectors albeit at a different rate. 
Abstract workers’ income share increased the most in high-skilled services (almost 
2.5 fold), in manufacturing it more than doubled, while in low-skilled services it 
increased by 50 percent. Manual workers’ income share increased the most in 
manufacturing (it increased six fold), in high-skilled services it more than doubled, 
whereas in low-skilled services it increased but less than doubled.  
It is important to note that for values of the elasticity of substitution below 1, the 
change in relative wages and the change in income shares imply changes of opposite 
sign in relative productivities. The changes in relative income shares are much larger 
than the changes in relative wages. The lower is η the smaller is the change implied 
by the change in income shares, but even for relatively low values of η it dominates 
the implied change coming from wages. We can therefore conclude that the 
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productivity of routine workers had to increase in all sectors relative to both manual 
and abstract workers. This is a pattern common across sectors, and it is in line with 
the routinization hypothesis. The relative productivity of routine workers increased, 
and since different occupations are complements in production in all sectors, this 
implies a lower relative demand for routine workers in all sectors. At the same time, 
the magnitude of change in relative income shares is markedly different across 
sectors, which point to the presence of sector-occupation specific changes in 
productivity. 
Next we analyze the evolution of relative productivities across sectors. This is 
informed by the movement of relative sectoral prices. Using relative occupational 
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.  (9) 
These two equations show that the evolution of relative sector-occupation 
productivities across sectors can be inferred from changes in relative sectoral prices 
and in the cross-sector ratio of routine workers’ income shares. 
Figure 8 shows how these two objects evolved over time, compared to their 1960 
values. The relative income share of routine workers in manufacturing increased by 
more than 30 percent relative to high-skilled services, while relative to low-skilled 
services it fell, by just under 10 percent. Both relative prices fluctuated a bit, but 
while overall there was no significant change in the relative price of low-skilled 
services compared to manufacturing (but it decreased slightly), the relative price of 
high-skilled services increased by almost 80 percent.  
The trends in relative prices imply that routine workers’ technology improved at a 
faster rate in manufacturing than in high-skilled service, and at a slightly lower rate 
than in low-skilled services. The changes in the relative income share of routine 
workers, however, point in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, unless the two just 
happen to offset each other, this analysis highlights that routine workers’ productivity 
changed not in the same way across sectors. For the range of the elasticity of 
substitution considered in the literature, i.e. η ∈ (0.5,0.9), stronger conclusions can be 
drawn. Given the documented data, the implied change coming from income shares 
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dominates, implying that routine workers’ productivity in manufacturing grew faster 
than in low-skilled services, but it grew slower than in high-skilled services.  
More generally, interpreting the patterns in the data through the lens of our model 
suggests that technological change has been biased across sector-occupation cells – a 
pure bias across occupations or sectors alone is not enough to explain the data. It is of 
course conceivable that there are common patterns in the cell technologies, such as 
common occupation or sector factors, but these are not the sole drivers. 
4  Conclusion 
In this article we reviewed our work in Bárány and Siegel (2018a,b) on the nexus of 
job polarization and structural transformation, stressing the importance of biased 
technological change as drivers of the observed changes in labor market outcomes 
both at the sectoral and at the occupational level. While sectoral reallocations, which 
might be caused by productivity growth differences across sectors, imply for 
occupations changes in employment shares and in wages that are qualitatively in line 
with certain aspects of the data, they cannot speak to the observed within-sector 
changes of occupational employment shares. This suggests that technological change 
must have been biased in more complex ways. However, explanations of 
technological change affecting workers according to their occupations differentially, 
such as ICT technologies adversely affecting workers in routine jobs, fall short of 
explaining all aspects of the data as well.  
We show, an occupation-bias in technology alone is not consistent with the joint 
observed changes in sectoral prices, occupational wages, and occupation-sector 
employment shares. Analyzing the data through our framework instead suggests that 
the productivity of routine workers relative to abstract or manual workers changed 
differentially across the three sectors we consider. This leaves the possibility that 
technological change is entirely specific to the sector-occupation cell, or that it is 
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Box for section 2.1 
 
Box for section 2.3  
 
Figure 1: Smoothed changes in wages and employment 
Source: Bárány and Siegel (2018a). The data is taken from IPUMS US Census data for 1950, 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000 and the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2007. The sample excludes agricultural 
occupations/industries and observations with missing wage data. Balanced occupation categories (183 of 
them) were defined by the authors based on meyer2005, dorn2009 and autor2013. The horizontal axis 
contains occupational skill percentiles based on their 1980 mean wages. In the left panel the vertical axis 
shows for each occupational skill percentile the 30-year change in log hourly real wages, whereas in the 
right panel it shows the 30-year change in employment shares (calculated as hours supplied).   
 
Figure 2: Polarization in broad occupational categories 
Source: Bárány and Siegel (2018a). These bar graphs show for ten broad occupational categories, as defined 
in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the decade-by-decade percentage change in mean log wages (left panel) 
and in hours worked (right panel).   
 
 
Figure 1 – as is standard in the literature, e.g. Autor et al. (2006), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and 
Autor and Dorn (2013) – shows smoothed changes in log real wages or in employment shares by 
percentiles of the occupational wage distribution, where occupations are ranked by their 'skill 
level', which is approximated by the average wage of workers in the given occupation in a base 
year. These occupations are then put into 100 bins on the horizontal axis, each representing 1 
percent of employment. For such a comparison over time a balanced set of occupational codes are 
needed. In Bárány and Siegel (2018a) we construct the finest possible set of occupational codes 
that is balanced over 1950 to 2007, extending the work of Meyer and Osborne (2005) and Dorn 
(2009). 
Industries are classified into our three categories as follows: low-skilled services are personal 
services, entertainment, low-skilled transport, low-skilled business and repair services, retail trade, 
and wholesale trade; manufacturing also includes construction and mining; high-skilled services 
are professional and related services, finance, insurance and real estate, communications, 
high-skilled business services, utilities, high-skilled transport, and public administration. In terms 
of occupations, manual workers are those working in: housekeeping, cleaning, protective service, 
food preparation and service, building, grounds cleaning, maintenance, personal appearance, 
recreation and hospitality, child care workers, personal care, service, healthcare support. Routine 
occupations are construction trades, extractive, machine operators, assemblers, inspectors, 
mechanics and repairers, precision production, transportation and material moving occupations, 
sales, administrative support. Finally abstract occupations comprise managers, management 
related, professional specialty, technicians and related support workers. 
16 
  
Figure 3: Polarization for broad occupations 
Source: Bárány and Siegel (2018a). Occupational wage premia and employment shares (in terms of hours) 
are calculated from the same data as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into one of three occupations 
based on their occupation code (for details of the occupation classification see text). The left panel shows 
relative wages: the abstract and the manual premium compared to routine (and their 95% confidence 
intervals), implied by the regression of log wages on gender, race, a polynomial in potential experience, and 
occupation dummies. The right panel shows employment shares, calculated in terms of hours worked.    
 
Figure 4: Polarization for broad industries 
Source: Bárány and Siegel (2018a). The data used is the same as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into 
one of three sectors based on their industry code (for details of the industry classification see text). The left 
panel shows relative wages: the high-skilled service and the low-skilled service premium compared to 
manufacturing (and their 95% confidence intervals), implied by the regression of log wages on gender, race, 
a polynomial in potential experience, and sector dummies. The right panel shows employment shares, 
calculated in terms of hours worked. The dashed vertical line represents 1960, from when on manufacturing 
employment has been contracting. 
  
Figure 5: Sector-occupation employment 
The data used is the same as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into one of three sectors based on their 
industry code and one of three occupations based on their occupation code (for details of the industry and 
the occupation classification see text), employment shares in the entire economy are calculated in terms of 
hours.   
  
Figure 6: Change in relative occupational wages 
The data is taken from IPUMS US Census data for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the American 
Community Survey (ACS) for 2007. Each worker is classified into one of three occupations based on their 
occupation code (for details of the occupation classification see text).   
  
Figure 7: Change in relative occupational income by sector 
The data used is the same as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into one of three sectors based on their 
industry code and one of three occupations based on their occupation code (for details of the industry and 
the occupation classification see text). The left panel shows the change in relative occupational income 
shares from 1960 in low-skilled services, the middle in manufacturing, and the right in high-skilled in 
services.  
  
Figure 8: Change in relative routine income and prices across sectors 
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The data is taken from IPUMS US Census data for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the American 
Community Survey (ACS) for 2007 and the BEA. Each worker is classified into one of three sectors based 
on their industry code and one of three occupations based on their occupation code (for details of the 
industry and the occupation classification see text). The left panel shows the change in relative routine 
occupational income shares from 1960 across sectors, while the right panel shows the change in relative 
sectoral prices across sectors.   
Table 1: Decomposition of changes in occupational employment shares 
 Employment shares 
 3 x 3 10 x 11 
 1950-2007 1960-2007 1950-2007 1960-2007 
Manual   
Total Δ 2.98 5.68 2.98 5.68 
Between Δ 2.30 3.07 3.13 4.38 









































       
Source: Bárány and Siegel (2018a). Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row 
presents the total change, the second the between-industry component, and the third the within-industry 
component over the period 1950 or 1960 to 2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, 
the last two use 10 occupations and 11 industries. The 10 occupations are the same as in Figure 2, while the 
11 industries are: 1 personal services; entertainment and low-skilled business and service repairs, 2 
low-skilled transport, 3 retail trade, 4 wholesale trade, 5 extractive industries, 6 construction, 7 
manufacturing, 8 professional and related services and high-skilled business services, 9 finance, insurance, 
and real estate, 10 high-skilled transport and public utilities (incl. communications), 11 public 
administration.  
Table 2: Decomposition of changes in relative occupational wages 
 Relative wages 
 3 x 3 10 x 11 
 1950-2007 1960-2007 1950-2007 1960-2007 
Manual/Routine   
Total Δ 0.289 0.310 0.289 0.310 
Industry Δ 0.180 0.148 0.225 0.218 





















       
Source: Bárány and Siegel (2018a). Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row 
presents the total change, the second the industry component, and the third the occupation component over 
the period 1950 or 1960 to 2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, columns three and 
four 10 occupations and 11 industries.   
